Abstract: This paper considers a previously unexamined increase in excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel that were part of Washington State's Nickel Funding Package of 2003. We fail to reject full pass-through of the amount of the tax increase to retail prices in both products. We find no significant sensitivity of retail pass-through to station locations relative to state borders, or to retail competitive conditions as measured by local station density. The expansion of hypermarkets in Washington State during the period was a confounding factor that limited precision in estimating tax pass-through effects.
I. Introduction
This paper considers the pass-through of a previously unexamined increase in excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel that were part of Washington State's Nickel Funding Package of 2003. Although there is disagreement on whether pass-through is complete, earlier studies of gasoline taxes have consistently found that consumers bear the bulk of the taxes. Previous studies agree less on why pass-through may be incomplete or may vary from one geographic area to another. Some analysts believe that incomplete pass-through is due to rising marginal costs in production or distribution; others point to less than fully competitive conduct.
Here we examine pass-through in both gasoline and diesel fuel. To our knowledge incidence in diesel has not previously been analyzed. Diesel fuel may have a different level of pass-through given the different supply and demand conditions. To the extent that pass-through is incomplete, we attempt to identify likely causes. Comparing all stations in Washington State to those in Oregon before and after the tax change shows pass-through is less than complete.
Further analysis, however, suggests the entry and ongoing expansion of hypermarkets affects this estimate. We, ultimately, conclude that we cannot reject full pass-through of the change in the state excise tax on gasoline and diesel to consumers. Our findings also strongly indicate no tax incidence at wholesale, a result contrary to those of some previous studies.
Section II reviews the literature on tax pass-through in gasoline. Section III offers background on the industry and the 2003 tax change. Section IV outlines our conceptual framework and describes the data. Section V presents our empirical findings. Section VI offers concluding discussion.
II. Literature on Tax Pass-Through Gasoline Taxes
Tax pass-through is the rate of price increase to consumers per unit of tax imposed.
Under perfect competition, the pass-through has an upper bound of one and is determined by the relative elasticities of supply and demand. In models of less than perfect competition, passthrough rates also depend on the curvature of demand and degree of market competitiveness (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013) .
Four recent studies examine pass-through of state gasoline taxes. Using monthly, state level data for the 48 mainland states and the District of Columbia between 1989 and 1997, Chouinard and Perloff (2004) estimate a reduced form model with a variety of demand and cost shifters and with state and seasonal fixed effects. They find that consumers bear most of the taxes, but that consumer incidence is smaller in larger states. They attribute incidence differences to varying state-level supply elasticities. In their model, state-level supply elasticities, which reflect wholesalers' abilities to ship gasoline to lower tax states, are inversely related to a state's share of national consumption. 2 Chouinard and Perloff estimate that a 1 cent per gallon ("cpg") tax increase would raise retail prices by 0.97 cpg in Vermont, the smallest consuming state, but only by 0.75 cpg in California, the largest consuming state. Barron, Blanchard and Umbeck (2004) examine a seven cpg excise tax reduction in Connecticut in July 2000. Their analysis relies on bi-weekly, station-level, retail prices and weekly, brand level, dealer tank wagon wholesale prices. 3 Using a difference in difference ("DID") approach, they compare pre and post-tax-change gasoline prices in Hartford, CT with prices in other northeast metropolitan locations, assuming seasonal and state fixed effects and six-month pre and post event windows. Barron, Blanchard and Umbeck find a consumer passthrough of about two-thirds. 4 They conclude that rising costs at refineries absorbed most of the remaining the tax decrease. They also find that retailers' revenue per gallon increased by a very small (but statistically insignificant) amount, an effect possibly reflecting rising marginal costs at retail. Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) indicate that about 70% of the tax reduction was passed on to consumers with 80 to 100% of an increase being passed on. They also observe that pass-through occurred quickly, happening within a week of the tax change.
Doyle and Samphantharak also explore effects of local, brand-level retail concentration on tax pass-through. Some of their findings suggest that greater brand concentration is associated with higher pass-through rates, especially for tax increases. They also find some evidence of smaller pass-through, particularly for reinstatements, at affected retail locations close to the state border and some mixed evidence of price effects across state borders.
The authors also examine the effects of the tax changes on wholesale prices. They argue that the quantity changes associated with tax changes were likely to be so small that the marginal cost of wholesale gasoline should be unaffected by the taxes changes. In their view, any impact on wholesale prices might suggest that wholesale markets may not be competitive. Under this assumption that wholesale supply is (locally) perfectly elastic, they see evidence of less than full pass-through in one of three tax change regressions. and cost shifters and with state and time (monthly) fixed effects, they find a state excise tax passthrough of nearly 100% across all states, with slightly lower pass-through in more rural states.
Arguing that retail markets in more urbanized states are likely to be more competitive, the authors attribute the somewhat lower pass-through rate in rural states to weaker retail competition. 5 Across all states, they find that tax changes are fully passed through in the first month of the change though they observe statistically significant second month effects in medium and highly urbanized states.
In sum, recent studies present broadly consistent results about the incidence of state gasoline taxes. Gasoline taxes are mostly borne by consumers. Evidence for over-shifting is limited. Tax pass-through appears to take place quickly. Quick pass-through of tax changes is consistent with Duffy-Deno (1996 ), EIA (1999 ), EIA (2003 , and Lewis and Noel (2010) , all of which find relatively quick pass-through of changes in wholesale gasoline prices to retail prices.
Previous studies agree less whether incomplete pass-through is cost or competition related. 5 Alm et al. observe that pass-through was greater for medium urbanized states than for highly urbanized states, a finding inconsistent with a view that highly urbanized states should have the highest pass-through, at least if demand were approximately linear. The authors also found some evidence of over shifting for medium urbanized states. Attributing incidence effects to competition differences across states requires assuming that there is no correlation between state urbanization and state-level supply elasiticities. billion dollars to pay for 158 highway transportation-related projects over ten years. 13 The tax increases went into effect on July 1, 2003.
III. Industry Background

IV. Conceptual Framework and Data
We estimate the tax pass-through with a difference-in-difference identification. We compare Washington State gasoline and diesel prices before and after the tax change with prices in nearby states (primarily Oregon). We evaluate tax incidence at wholesale and retail in separate regressions for each product. The state and federal taxes are collected at the retail level but this antitrust-enforcement-report-staff-federal-trade/040813mergersinpetrolberpt.pdf. Hereafter referred to as the "FTC Petroleum Merger Report." 11 FTC Petroleum Merger Report, does not preclude possible wholesale effects of the tax. We measure short run demand and supply sensitivity. This short run would be long enough for non-capital adjustments by consumers (e.g. changed driving patterns) and sellers (e.g. changed refinery runs, changed geographic allocation of product, changed retail hours), but not long enough for significant capital-related adjustments (e.g. more fuel efficient vehicles, refinery reconfigurations, retailer entry or exit). We use three and six month periods around the tax change to measure passthrough.
We believe wholesaling in the Pacific Northwest was approximately competitive. This would imply no change in wholesale prices due to the tax change. No Washington State refiner was large enough for unilateral market power to be plausible. Significant departures from marginal cost pricing would require coordination among the state's five refiners. In addition to the challenges in achieving and maintaining coordination among the five, shipments from California, from refineries in the Rockies and from foreign refineries would present significant obstacles to anticompetitive coordination.
14 We assume that gasoline and diesel retailing is differentiated, spatially and by brand, and that departures from marginal cost pricing are limited by entry and rival repositioning. We assume that retailer-level, short run demand elasticities vary according to the extent of localized competition raising the possibility of differing pass-through rates.
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Our basic estimating equation is:
(1)
Where P i,t is gasoline station (rack) i's price on the day t. it  is the constant. The dummy takes a value of one in the period after the tax increase. The interaction term After t *Treatment i is one for each rack or station in a treatment area in the period after the tax increase. The interaction variable coefficient, 2 B ,measures the effect of the tax increase controlling for the fixed difference in the treatment and control racks or stations before the tax change and the change in prices in the control areas in the period after the tax increase. The next two terms, Station(rack) and Week, are station (rack) and week fixed effects. The variable, , is the error term. In other words, we are controlling for common changes in the weekly price of the product across the treatment and control prices, station (rack) level fixed effects, and then measuring the price in the treatment group relative to the and control group before and after the event. We adopt a null hypothesis of full pass-through at retail and zero pass-through at wholesale (rack).
Petroleum product prices are highly autocorrelated. We use the price for one day per week (Thursday) to reduce autocorrelation. 16 Retrospectives of petroleum product mergers have used one of two approaches for dealing with autocorrelation. Hosken, Silvia, and Taylor (2011) showed a 1 percent price increase led to a 3 times larger quantity effect for stations with the greatest number of local competitors relative to stations with the least number of nearby competitors. Definitively attributing presumably smaller pass-through to relatively weak local competition requires that retailer cost elasticities are uncorrelated with the degree of local competition however. 16 We also computed the results for alternative days and this did not qualitatively affect the results.
recognize that OLS remains unbiased and consistent in the presence of autocorrelation and uses standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the underlying data. Taylor and Hosken (2007) take an alternative approach and model the autocorrelation using the Prais-Winsten correction. This approach should be more efficient. Kreisle (2013) shows that under some statistical circumstances common to gasoline and diesel price data, modeling the autocorrelation in this way tends to perform better and comes closer to estimating the true relationship than using OLS with corrected standard errors. Here we report results using the Prais-Winsten correction. Results under the alternative approach, OLS with Newey-West standard errors (which we do not report) are similar however.
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Price data comes from the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS). 18 Rack prices consist of terminal-average daily price quotes of unbranded gasoline and diesel at terminal locations.
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We have 2003 data for twelve rack locations--seven in Washington State (Anacortes, Moses Lake, Pasco, Seattle, Spokane, Tacoma and Wilma), two in Oregon (Portland and Eugene) and one each in Montana (Billings), Utah (Salt Lake City) and Colorado (Denver). We use the Denver rack data as an additional check on the stability of the control racks.
OPIS retailer price data are derived from corporate fleet card transactions and some credit card transactions. OPIS records the last transaction price charged at the station on a given day.
While the gasoline and diesel pricing data from OPIS are among the best available, it is not a random sample of retail stations. Each station may also not report every day. We use station level fixed effects to control for changes in sample composition. 17 We generated our estimates with STATA. Estimations with the Prais-Winsten correction for autocorrelation were implemented using the xtregar command. The xtreg command implemented OLS estimations with corrected standard errors. 18 All gasoline data refer to conventional specification, regular octane. Octane and fuel specification distinctions are not relevant for on-the-road diesel. 19 We prefer wholesale unbranded to branded prices because unbranded is typically closer to a transactions price. Distributors who buy at posted rack prices under branded contracts may also receive various discounts, allowances and rebates from branded sellers. Our results, however, do not materially change with branded rack prices. gasoline and diesel were lower in the west than in the east. This fact pattern is consistent with the logistical differences at wholesale supply discussed above, particularly the greater distances of eastern terminals to refineries (or points of marine landings) compared with the western terminals. Area averages mask the considerable contemporaneous price variation among retailers within areas. For example, in the week before the tax increase, retail gasoline prices in the Seattle area ranged from 144 cpg to 190 cpg, with a range in diesel of 160 cpg to 180 cpg.
Similarly, at that time gasoline prices in Portland at the time ranged between 150 cpg to 180 cpg, with diesel prices ranging between 160 cpg and 180 cpg. Although the differences between the highest and lowest retailer in an area might be 20 cpg or greater, most retailers charged prices much closer to the area average.
V. Empirical Results
Inspection of the raw gasoline retail price data for Washington State overall suggest a nearly immediate impact of the tax change. 20 Figure 1 shows daily average gasoline prices in Washington State, less the price in Oregon, controlling for station level fixed effects, in the month before and after the tax change on July 1, 2003. The average price for July 1 was about 4 cpg more than the previous day, with smaller increases over the next several days.
Consistent with Barron, Blanchard and Umbeck, we estimate the tax pass-through using six-month pre and post tax change windows. We also provide estimates using three-month windows. Though the raw data suggests a nearly immediate impact of the tax change upon retail prices, using shorter comparison periods to estimate pass-through is problematic for two reasons.
First, since we are using one day a week of data to mitigate autocorrelation, shorter windows would have a very small number of observations. Second, because there is noise in the price relationships between treatment and control areas, windows of short duration are more likely to generate spurious results.
Our pass-through analysis begins at wholesale. We find no evidence that the tax change significantly affected Washington State rack prices as a whole for either gasoline or diesel fuel.
The first two rows of Table 3 show DID estimates in gasoline and diesel for symmetric pre-event and post-event windows of three and six months, utilizing all Washington State treatment and non-Washington State controls. 21 Negative point estimates would be expected if the state's 20 A comparable graph for retail diesel similarly suggests an immediate price impact upon implementation of the tax, while inspection of the raw gasoline and diesel wholesale data shows no obvious immediate impact. 21 For this comparison, we used all the racks listed on Table 1 with the exception of Denver. We checked whether geographic reallocation of supply by refiners and other wholesalers in reaction to the tax increase might bias our estimates downward. For example, Oregon wholesale prices might fall if Puget Sound refiners responded to a taxrelated reduction in wholesale demand in their home market by redirecting some refinery output to Oregon terminals. Conceivably, there might be a similar depressing effect in Billings and Salt Lake City, as refiners in those gasoline or diesel were inelastically supplied at wholesale. However, all gasoline estimates and two of the four diesel estimates are positive, and more importantly none of estimates come close to being significantly different from zero.
Owing to their more remote location from refineries and key logistical supply points, it is possible that eastern Washington State terminals, Pasco, Mosses Lake, Spokane and Wilma, were less elastically supplied than those in the west, Anacortes, Seattle, and Tacoma. If so, wholesale prices in the east could fall relative to those in the west after the tax increase. We find no evidence of such an effect, as the last two rows of Table 3 shows results evaluating whether the tax increase affected the wholesale prices in eastern Washington State relative to those in western Washington State. The list of which racks are include in the east and west groupings are given on Table 1 . No parameter estimates are significantly different from zero and a number of the point estimates are very close to zero as well.
These wholesale findings overall suggest that full pass-through to retail might be expected. Table 4 shows estimates for equation (1) for gasoline and diesel based on the full sample of Washington and Oregon retailers for symmetric pre/post windows of three and six months. These estimates, however, indicate that pass-through to consumers was incomplete in gasoline. Diesel estimates are somewhat less precise owing to the smaller sample size compared to gasoline.
As is well known, DID estimation critically assumes a constant price differential between the treatment and control markets, except for change caused by the event. It appears that the entry and expansion of hypermarkets not only affected retail prices in Washington State relative locations shipped somewhat less into Washington State. Accordingly, we compared wholesale prices in these control areas with wholesale prices in Denver, where marginal supply originates at refineries in the midcontinent and the Texas Panhandle and thus Denver prices were extremely unlikely to be affected by the Washington State tax change. Comparison of pre and post tax differentials for Denver/Portland, Denver/Billings and Denver/Salt Lake City showed no statistically significant change.
to Oregon over the period, but also affected relative retail prices within Washington State. 22 The mere existence of hypermarkets in differing degrees in treatment and control markets would not frustrate identification if their price effects were time-invariant, but this was not the case.
Washington State publishes data on underground fuel tanks. These data show the ongoing hypermarket entry in 2002 and 2003. 23 The leading urban locations of Seattle, Spokane, and Vancouver had most of this hypermarket entry. In particular, more than a third of the state's hypermarkets were in the Seattle Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and more than half were in the Seattle Combined Statistical Area ("CSA"). Oregon prices over the period, though the trend in diesel was weaker.
To mitigate the confounding effects from hypermarket entry, we re-estimate equation (1) removing from the sample those parts of Washington State and Oregon with significant hypermarket activity. 25 In a "hypermarket free" sample, shown in Table 5 , point estimates are higher compared to the full sample. A full, five cpg pass-through to consumers cannot be rejected for either product for both window lengths. The gasoline results show a point estimate between 4.75 and 5.00 cents per gallon with a standard deviation of approximately 0.25 cpg.
Retail gasoline prices depend, in part, on local competition. If competitive differences result in differing retailer-level demand elasticities, we might expect some differences in tax pass-through across retailers. We first consider whether pass-through is sensitive to retailers' locations relative to state borders. We test whether the difference in prices at Washington State stations located "close to" important border crossings vary pre and post tax change relative to stations elsewhere in the state. Close to border stations, presumably, should post smaller price increases than stations elsewhere in the state. We estimate equation (1) using stations close to the Washington border as the treatments and the controls are the stations in the rest of the state. We limit the treatment and control areas to those without significant hypermarket entry, with the exception of the Idaho border.
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We find little evidence of border effects for Washington retailers in either gasoline or diesel. Table 6 shows the close-to-border results for Canada, Idaho and Oregon; estimates refer to the difference in pass-through for near border stations compared to other stations in Washington State (excluding areas impacted by hypermarkets). While point estimates for gasoline and diesel for the Oregon border are negative, many other estimates have the wrong sign. In every case, we cannot reject the null of equal pass-through. 25 The hypermarket areas in Washington are the Seattle CSA, Spokane, Cowlitz and Clark counties and the Portland MSA in Oregon. 26 The larger number of observations in the Idaho regressions are due to including Spokane, a hypermarket area. Those Spokane zip codes adjacent to the border are included in the treatment and the rest of the Spokane MSA is included in the control. Without the Spokane treatment stations, there would not have been enough observations to estimate the one month and three month regressions due to the small number of treatment stations
We do find evidence of border effects for Oregon stations in both gasoline and diesel.
Similar to the above estimation, we estimated equation (1) with data from Oregon. The treatment stations are near the border and the control stations are in the rest of the state less the hypermarket areas. As reported in Table 7 , gasoline and diesel prices increased significantly at
Oregon retailers located close to the Washington State border in 6-month window specifications and one of the 3-month window specifications. These effects dissipate, however, when we Tables 8 shows the estimated pass-through for the four categories of stations for gasoline and diesel prices for both three and six-month windows. We re-estimate equation (1) using the non-hypermarket areas of Washington and Oregon, but with a different pass-through parameter for each of the four categories of station. The point estimates for the gasoline tax pass-through for each category are all close to 5 cpg, while point estimates for diesel are more variable across station categories in some cases close to or exceeding 7 cpg. However, none of the differences in point estimates across categories are statistically different at usual levels of significance, and in no case can full pass-through be rejected. Not only is there no difference in the estimated passthrough across the categories, but there also does not seem to be a pattern, i.e. the rank order of pass through is not the same for any of the products or windows.
VI. Discussion
West Coast refiners were generally operating close to capacity in the early 2000s, and the tax increase occurred right at the peak of summertime demand. Under these circumstances the tax increase might be expected to reduce wholesale prices owing to diminishing returns.
On the other hand, the reduction in quantity demanded due to the tax increase was small Our main retail result is that we fail to reject full tax pass-through in gasoline and diesel.
These findings are consistent with those in most previous studies of gasoline. The similarity of diesel to gasoline pass-through of is not surprising-the demands for both products are highly inelastic and the costs of producing and distributing the two products are similar.
Full pass-through is also consistent with our expectation about retail-level short run cost elasticities within the quantity range relevant to the tax change. Assuming a statewide reduction in demand of about 1MBD, a significant impact upon marginal costs at the retail level seems unlikely. A reduction of 1 MBD of gasoline is equivalent to 42,000 gallons per day.
Washington State had about 3,100 gas stations in the early 2000s. Given a daily statewide reduction of 42,000 gallons, the average gas station would see a reduction in sales of just fewer than 14 gallons per day, or about less than one vehicle visit per day. Such a small quantity reduction also seems unlikely to significantly affect costs at the margin of tank-wagon deliveries from product terminals.
Consequently, any differences in pass-through at the station level in our framework of differentiated retail competition would be driven by differences in station level demand elasticities. We examined for near border effects based on the notion that stations close to the borders would be more constrained in increasing prices than others in the state. We find no significant differences in pass-through for retailers located close to the Canadian, Idaho and
Oregon borders compared to other Washington retailers.
The absence of a pass-through differential near the Canadian border is not surprising.
Gasoline prices on the Canadian side (the greater Vancouver area) averaged more than 40 cpg greater than nearby Washington State stations in the first half 2003, while Canadian diesel was about 25 cpg greater than that available just across the border in Washington State. Canadian stations were very likely a weak constraint on the pass-through by close to border Washington stations. Pre-tax price differentials are less persuasive as explanation for an absence of differential pass-through effects for Washington stations on the Oregon and Idaho borders since the price differences were much smaller that the differences with Canada.
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Conceivably the absence of pass-through differentials for Washington border stations might be attributed to the rural nature of these border areas, such as low demand density or limited road connections to neighboring states, factors which would limit the diversion of
demand. Yet arbitrage across at least the Washington/Oregon border appeared to robust enough to increase significantly gasoline and diesel prices at Oregon stations adjacent to the Washington border. This effect in Oregon, however, dissipated somewhat further away from the border.
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We found no strong evidence that localized competitive conditions matter to passthrough. Full-pass through cannot be rejected for any of the categories of stations or that the estimated pass-through was different by competitive category.
The expansion of hypermarkets in Washington State complicated in identifying passthrough. The hypermarket areas of Washington State comprise over half of the station observations for gasoline and diesel prices. By eliminating the hypermarket area observations, due to the changes in retail competition in those areas, the size of the standard errors on the passthrough estimates increased. 29 Given the changing face of gasoline and diesel retailing, e.g. the increasing importance of convenience stores and the entrance of hypermarkets, any estimation using multiple regions where retailing may have evolved differently is problematic. This suggests that researchers should exercise caution in using sizeable panels of data in this or similar industries. One possibility for mitigating the changing retail situation in Washington, i.e.
hypermarket entry would be to use shorter pre and post event windows. Though the raw data suggests a nearly immediate impact of the tax change upon retail prices, using windows to estimate pass-through is problematic for two reasons. First, since we used one day a week of data to reduce autocorrelation, shorter windows would have a very small number of observations on each station with which to estimate both the station fixed effects and the effect of the tax change. Second, because there is noise in the price relationships between treatment and control areas, windows of short duration are more likely to generate spurious results. For example in our case, the underlying difference between treatment and control areas, such as the states of Washington and Oregon, showed week-to-week changes in some instance of greater than one cent per gallon. 30 This suggests that researchers should exercise caution in using very short pre and post windows when performing event studies when data have similar properties. 30 We calculated the average daily price of gasoline in Washington and Oregon by regressing the price in each state on daily dummy variables and station fixed effects. We then took the weekly average difference of those state level averages. The average week-to-week change in the difference between the state average prices ranged from .07 to 1.1 cents per gallon in the 6 months before the tax change. This is the difference, Washington less Oregon, in the average station price by day controlling for station level fixed effects. This is the difference, Seattle less the rest of Washington, in the average station price by month controlling for station level fixed effects. 
